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Notwithstanding Verdict
ROBERT M. HUNTER*
In a large percentage of personal injury and wrongful death
actions, the hurdle which is feared most by the plaintiff's attorney
is that raised by a motion for a directed verdict.' Statistics are not
available to indicate the percentage of such actions which have been
terminated by a directed verdict. In cases against municipalities the
figure would probably be larger than for actions against other types
of defendants.- While experienced trial lawyers are fully aware of
the possibility of a directed verdict, it seems to be the fact that
many lawyers are not and often so present their cases as to make a
directed verdict almost inevitable.
The motion is frequently made by defendant's counsel at the
conclusion of the opening statement for the plaintiff. As one listens
to the short, carelessly phrased statement sometimes made by an
inexperienced lawyer it seems that he must not know that it is
possible that his client will lose the case without an opportunity to
put on a witness. Surely, few experiences could be more embarrass-
ing to a lawyer than that of having his opening statement made
the basis for direction of a verdict against his client. It has happen-
ed many times.3
The motion at the conclusion of the opening statement may be
either for a directed verdict or for dismissal of the action.4 It is prob-
* Professor of Law, College of Law, The Ohio State University.
1 Synonymous terms are "instructed verdict", Steel Materials Corp. v.
Stern, 82 Ohio App. 89, 77 N.E. 2d 272 (1947), and "peremptory instruction",
Farley, Instructons to Juries - Their Role in the Judical Process, 52 YAXX
L. 3. 194, 218 (1932).
2 The course in Ohio Court Practice is required of all third-year students
at The Ohio State University College of Law. Part of the course consists of
the trial of a case based upon facts found in a current motion picture. Prior
to participating in the trial of this Practice Court case, each student is required
to make a written report of an actual trial in the common pleas court. From
these reports and from oral statements of the students as to their difficulties
resulting from settlements and directed verdicts, a fairly accurate picture of
the civil jury litigation in Franklin County Common Pleas Court is being
acquired.
3 E.g., Gross v. Campbell, 118 Ohio St. 285, 160 N.E. 852 (1928); Fini v.
Perry, 119 Ohio St. 367, 164 N.E. 358 (1928); Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Barragate,
125 Ohio St. 190, 180 N.E. 694 (1932); Cervone v. Youngstown, 18 Ohio L. Abs.
109 (1934); Cheney v. Garrett, 50 Ohio L. Abs. 150, 76 N.E. 2d 96 (1947); and
cases cted in 39 Omo Jun., Trial, § 225 et seq., 12 PAGe'S Omo DiG., Trial, 105.1-
4 39 OHio J-u. 883; Cornell v. Morrison, 87 Ohio St. 215, 100 N.E. 817 (1912);
64 C.J., Trial, § 391 (1933).
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able that a court would be somewhat more reluctanb to direct a
verdict, thus laying the basis for a judgment on the merits. A dis-
missal of the action would not preclude the filing of another peti-
tion if the statute of limitations did not prevent it. Defendant's
counsel would naturally prefer a directed verdict. However, he
might be satisfied with a dismissal.
If the opening statement affirmatively shows that the action
is based upon a contract which is against policy, or illegal for any
reason, or that the statute of limitations has barred the claim, either
a directed verdict or a dismissal may be expected.5 Even in such
cases an opportunity should be given plaintiff's counsel to modify
or explain his statement before defendant's motion will be granted.6
A fortiori, when the motion is predicated upon a mere omission
from the statement, opportunity should be given to supply the
lacking element.7
The disagreement which has existed for the past century as to
thetest to be applied in directing a verdict wvouldseemtohave no ap-
plication when the motion is made following the opening statement.
If counsel states that evidence will be produced to substantiate his
client's claims as to each material issue, there is no occasion for
raising a question as to the adequacy of the statement.8
If the defendant's motion following the opening statement is
overruled, he has the choice of resting upon that ruling or proceed-
ing with the trial. If the trial proceeds, the action of the court in
overruling the motion should not be assignable as error in the
event of an appeal following final judgment.9 Any review of the
proceedings on a motion for a new trial or on appeal should take
into account the evidence actually introduced rather than counsel's
statement as to the evidence which is expected to be produced. This
would seem to follow a fortiori from the rule which has been adopt-
ed in connection with the overruling of the motion following the
plaintiff's evidence. 10
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence, he is, of course,
no more entitled to a directed verdict than he would have been prior
to the presentation of his evidence. The defendant is entitled to his
day in court. This means an opportunity to meet the evidence
S See Note, Direction of Verdict on Opening Statement of Counsel, 129
A.L.R. 557; Gross v. Campbell, 118 Ohio St. 285, 160 N.E. 852 (1928); Oscanyan
v. Winchester Repeating Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261 (1881); Wrightson v. Dough-
erty, 5 Cal. 2d 257, 54 P. 2d 13 (1936).
6 Pociey v. Pierrot, 17 Ohio App. 175 (1922); Cornell v. Morrison, 87 Ohio
St. 215, 100 N.E. 817 (1912).
7 39 OHIo JuR., Trial, § 228 and cases cited.
8 39 Omo JuR., Trial, § 226.
9 9WiGMo , EVmENCE 315 (3rd Ed. 1940).
10 See note 40, infra.
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against him by presenting evidence of his own. However, the
defendant may be entitled to a directed verdict, and at this point, for
the first time it becomes necessary for the court to choose among
the several criteria which have been applied by various courts at
various times. For simplicity, these may be called "the scintilla
rule", "the reasonable mind's test", and "the new trial test".
Under the "scintilla rule," if there is any evidence whatever,
even a mere scintilla, in support of each essential allegation of
plaintiff's statement of claims, declaration or petition, the court
should not direct a verdict against him." This rule was followed
in. England from the first case in which a verdict was directed for
defendant, probably in 1725,12 until the rule was repudiated in
1857.13
In this country, the scintilla rule was accepted and applied in
many jurisdictions. 14 In some states the period of its acceptance
was much longer than in others. The United States Supreme Court
at first applied this rule' 5 and continued to do so until 1857, the
year of its repudiation in England. In 1872 the supreme court fol-
lowed the lead of the English courts and ceased to apply the scin-
tilla rule.17 The New York Court of Appeals in 187418 and the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court in 1879,'9 likewise refused to continue
to recognize the rule.
The Ohio Supreme Court was among the last of the American
courts to abandon the scintilla rule.20 It had been applied at least
as early as 1856,21 the year before that in which the United States
Supreme Court last gave it expression, 22 and the year it was re-
pudiated in England.23 For more than seventy-five years, the Ohio
Supreme Court continued to give effect to the rule.
In a case decided in 1925,24 a minority of the court expressed
11 39 Omro JuR., Trial, 793, 868.
12 Syderbottom v. Smith, 1 Stranges 649, 93 Eng. Rep. 759. See Smith, The
Power of the Judge to Direct a Verdict: Section 457a of the New York Civil
Practice Act, 24 CoL. L. REV. 1M1 (1924); Blume, Origin and Development of
the Directed Verdict, 48 MIcH L. Ray. 555 (1950).
'13 Toomey v. London Ry. Co., 3 C.B. (N.S.) 146, 140 Eng. Rep. 694. See
Smith op. cit. supra note at 114.
1453 AZ. Ju. , Trial, 285.
15 Greenleaf v. Birth, 9 Pet. (34 U.S.) 292, at 299 (1835).
16 Richardson v. City of Breton, 11 How. (52 U.S.) 361 (1857).
17 Improvement Co. v. Munson, 14 Wall. (81 U.S.) 442 (1871).
18 Baulec v. RR. Co., 59 N.Y. 356 (1874).
19 Hyatt v. Johnson, 91 Pa. St. 196 (1879).
2
o Hamden Lodge v. Gas Co., 127 Ohio St. 469, 475, 189 N.E. 246 (1934).
21 Ellis & Morton v. Ohio Life Ins. & Tr. Co., 4 Ohio St. 628 (1855).
22 Supra note 16.
23 Supra note 13.
24 Cleveland-Akron Rag Co. v. Jaite, 112 Ohio St. 506, 514, 148 N.E. 82
(1925).
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disapproval of the rule but could not muster the necessary votes
to commit the court to its repudiation. Three years later the follow-
ing language was used in the syllabus of a case: "When the proof
of the essential facts put in issue and the reasonable inferences
deducible therefrom are such that the jury, as fairminded men,
should reasonably arrive at but one conclusion, it is the duty of the
trial court to direct a verdict in favor of the party which such
proof sustains.1'25
In the same volume of reports, the syllabus of another case
contained similar language. 26 However, it was six years later before
the court explicitly repudiated the scintilla rule. In Hamden
Lodge v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co. 2 7 the syllabus contains the follow-
ing language:
1. The term 'scintilla', when used to designate a
rule of trial procedure, is confusing and misleading and
should be abandoned.
2. The so-called 'scintilla rule' requiring a trial judge
to submit a case to the jury if there is any evidence, how-
ever slight, tending to support each material issue, no
longer obtains in Ohio. (Second and third paragraphs of
the syllabus in Ellis & Morton v. Ohio Life Insurance
& Trust Co., 4 Ohio St. 628 and the case of Clark v. McFar-
land, 99 Ohio St. 100 overruled.)
3. Upon motion to direct a verdict the party against
whom the motion is made is entitled to have the evidence
construed most strongly in his favor. But if upon any es-
sential issue after giving the evidence such favorable con-
struction, reasonable minds can come to but one conclu-
sion and that conclusion is adverse to such party, the judge
should direct a verdict against him.
4. Where from the evidence reasonable minds reach dif-
ferent conclusions upon any question of fact, such question
of fact is for the jury. The test is not whether the trial
judge should set aside a verdict on the weight of the evi-
dence.
From the last sentence of this quotation it is clear that the
Ohio Supreme Court deliberately rejected the rule which the
United States Supreme Court adopted when it abandoned the
scintilla rule.
In his opinion in Pleasant v. Fant,2 s Mr. Justice Miller asks:
"Must the court go through the idle ceremony in such a case of
submitting to the jury the testimony on which plaintiff relies, when
it is clear to the judicial mind that if the jury should find a verdict
25 Jacob Laub Baking Co. v. Middleton, 118 Ohio St. 106, 160 NE. 629
(1928).26 Painesville Utopia Theatre Co. v. Lautermilch, 118 Ohio St. 167, 160 N.E.
633 (1928).
27 Supra note 20.
22 22 Wall. (89 U.S.) 116, 122 (1874).
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in favor of plaintiff that verdict would be set aside and a new trial
had?"
The negative answer to this question was consistently given
by the supreme court in cases involving direction of verdicts
until 1941.29 In that year Mr. Justice Black wrote the opinion for the
unanimous court in Berry v. United States.30 In it he said, "There
was evidence from which a jury could reach the conclusion that
petitioner was totally and permanently disabled. That was enough."
In De Zon v. American President Lines Ltd.31 and in Galloway v.
United States,3 2 Mr. Justice Black dissented because the majority
of the court applied a test for directing a verdict which he believed
had the effect of depriving plaintiff of his constitutional right to
jury trial.33 Justices Douglas and Murphy joined him in his dis-
sents in both cases.
In Wilkinson v. McCarthy,34 Mr. Justice Black -wrote the opin-
ion of the Court and in it he said, "And peremptory instructions
should not be given in negligence cases 'when the facts are in dis-
pute, and the evidence in relation to them is that from which fair-
minded men may draw different inferences,' Washington & G. R.
Co. v. McDade, 135 U.S. 554, 572. Such has ever since been the es-
tablished rule for trial and appellate courts. '35
In Brady v. Southern Ry. Co.,"" Mr. Justice Reed wrote the
majority opinion and said: "When evidence is such that without
weighing the credibility of the witnesses, there can be but one
reasonable conclusion as to the verdict, the court should determine
the proceeding by non-suit, directed verdict or otherwise in ac-
cordance with the applicable practice without submission to the
jury, or by judgment notwithstanding the verdict. By such direc-
tion of the trial, the result is saved from the mischance of speculation
over legally unfounded claims.a'37
While this language is similar to that used by the courts
which apply the reasonable mind's test, several of the cases cited
as authorities are those which approved the new trial test. Mr.
Justice Black wrote a dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices
2 9 See Blume op. cit. supra note 12.
30 312 U.S. 450 (1940).
31318 U.S. 660 (1943).
32 319 U.S. 372 (1943).
33 The related problem of the constitutionality of a statute forbidding the
direction of a verdict or nonsuit is dealt with in an annotation in 29 A.LJ.R
1287; the case which is annotated is Thoe v. C.I. & St. P.a Co., 181 Wis. 456,
195 N.W. 407 (1923); see also People v. McCurchy, 249 Mich. 147, 228 N.W.
723 (1930).
34 336 U.S. 53 (1949).
35 Id. p. 62.
36 320 U.S. 476 (1943).
37 Id. p. 479.
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Douglas, Murphy and Rutledge.
It would seem that the United States Supreme Court has on
occasion abandoned the new trial test and in recent cases has
wavered between acceptance of the reasonable mind's test and
return to the scintilla rule.
When defendant moves for a directed verdict at the conclusion
of plaintiff's evidence and the motion is overruled, defendant must
choose between standing upon the court's ruling and presenting his
own evidence. If he takes the latter course he thereby waives the
error, if any, in the court's ruling on his motion. In one case in
which the Ohio Supreme Court dealt with this question, it used
unfortunate language. It said, "In our judgment the defendant lost
the benefit of its motion for a verdict by introducing its evidence
without afterwards renewing the motion. In other words, proceeding
with the defense waived the motion, unless it was afterward re-
newed".38 In a later portion of the opinion, the Court said: "Giving
due consideration to the reasons which underlie the various de-
cisions, we are disposed to hold, that the exception to the motion for
a verdict at close of plaintiff's evidence, is waived by the defendant
by introducing his defense, unless the motion be renewed at the
end of the whole evidence, and if so renewed it challenges the
sufficiency of plaintiff's evidence taken in connection with the facts
which appear in the evidence introduced by the defendan". 39 This
would seem to mean that the second motion will be considered on
its own merits regardless of the state of the evidence at the time
of the first motion. In a subsequent case, the Court clarified this
situation:
"When a motion of a defendant for a directed verdict is
made at the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence and over-
ruled, the defendant has an election either to stand on his
exception to the ruling or to proceed with his defense; and
if he accepts the ruling, however erroneous it may be, and
proceeds with his defense, introducing evidence on his
own behalf, he thereby waives his right to rely on the
denial of his original motion.
The renewal of defendant's motion to direct a verdict at
the close of all the evidence challenges, not the sufficiency
of the evidence that was alone before the court and jury at
the time the original motion was made, but the evidence
and the state of the record as it exists at the conclusion of
all the evidence." 40
In a per curiam opinion in a subsequent case, the supreme
court said: "Unless a motion for a directed verdict is renewed
at the close of all the evidence, error cannot be predicated upon the
3 8 Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Durck, 78 Ohio St. 243, 249, 85 N.E. 38 (1908).
39 Id. p. 255.
40 Halkias v. Wilkoff Co., 141 Ohio St. 139, 47 N.E. 2d 199 (1943).
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refusal to direct a verdict.""' However, this would not seem to
raise a serious question as to the continued validity of the rule stated
in the syllabus of Halkias v. Wilkoff Co.
At the conclusion of all the evidence, if each party moves for
a directed verdict, complications may arise. If one party's motion
is ruled upon before the other's is made, each of the motions will
rest upon its own merits and the reasonable mind's test will deter-
mine whether either should be sustained or overruled. In some cases
a motion is made by the adverse party before a prior motion has
been decided and neither party requests that the case go to the
jury if his motion is overruled. They impliedly waive a jury
and the court is warranted in directing a verdict in favor of the
party who would have been entitled to judgment if a jury had been
waived at the commencement of the trial.42
However, either party may qualify his motion with a request
that if it is overruled the case shall be submitted to the jury.43
Moreover, if the court rules on the motions in inverse order and
sustains the second motion before overruling the first, the party
who moved first has the right to withdraw his motion and request
submission to the jury.44 In either of these situations, since the
waiver of the jury is a mere implication, any action of either
party which is clearly inconsistent with such implication should
be sufficient to prevent it. If either party requests that written in-
structions or interrogatories be submitted to the jury, he should
not be held to have waived a jury from the mere fact that both
parties have requested a directed verdict.
There is a substantial difference between the amount of evidence
essential to the direction of a verdict under the reasonable mind's
test and that necessary to uphold a determination by the court when
a jury has been waived.45 Counsel, aware of this difference, would
not ordinarily give up in behalf of his client the more favorable
rule when it may be preserved by the simple act of qualifying
the motion for directed verdict.
It seems to be a matter of some doubt in Ohio as to whether a
party, against whom a motion for directed verdict has been made,
should be permitted to reopen his case and introduce further
41 McKellips v. Industrial Commission, 145 Ohio St. 79, 80, 60 N.E. 2d 667
(1945).
42 First National Bank v. Hayes & Sons, 64 Ohio St. 100, 59 N.E. 893 (1901).
See annotations 18 A.L.R. 1433 (1922); 108 A.LR. 1315 (1937).
43 Steelmaterials Corp. v. Stern, 82 Ohio App. 89, 77 N.E. 2d 272 (1947).
See note 9 OHIo ST. L.J. 707 (1948) also Gorman, Problems in Trial Procedure,
12 Ohio Bar 475, 478 (1939).
44 Nead v. Hershman, 103 Ohio St. 12, 132 N. 19 (1921).
45 In the latter situation the test is whether the court's determination is
against the manifest weight of the evidence.
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testimony. In one court of appeals case, 46 it was held to be error
to refuse plaintiff the right to reopen. In another court of appeals
case, judgment was affirmed after the trial court had refused to
permit plaintiff to reopen his case. The record in this case was
certified to the supreme court because of the conflict between the
judgment and that in the case of Siegal v. Portage Yellow Cab Co.47
The supreme court' s disregarded the question which was involved
in the conflict and disposed of the case on another ground. In a third
case decided by still another court of appeals, it was held that the
trial court had not abused its discretion in refusing the plaintiff's
request to reopen when the request was not accompanied by a
tender of an appropriate amendment to the petition to support
the reception of proof.49
JUDGMENT NOTwIT=STANDING VERDICT
Prior to 1935 motion for the judgment notwithstanding verdict
in Ohio was limited to a consideration of the pleadings. 0 In that
year General Code, Section 11601 was amended to permit such a
judgment on the pleadings or the evidence.51 The effect of the
amendment was to allow a court to correct the error made in
improperly overruling a motion for directed verdict or to take
appropriate action if no such motion had been made. The criterion
to be applied in granting judgment under General Code, Section
11601 is exactly the same as that in directing a verdict, i.e., if
reasonable minds can reach but one conclusion. The section itself
precludes the new trial test from being applied by providing that
"no judgment shall be rendered by the Court on the ground that
the verdict is against the weight of the evidence."
In 1947 a new provision was added to the General Code,52
Section 11599-1 provides that: "No motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict may be filed after a judgment in conformity
to the verdict shall have been approved by the Court in writing
and filed with the clerk for journalization." It seems clear enough
that this section makes it mandatory that the party against whom
46 Siegal v. Yellow Cab Co., 23 Ohio App. 438, 155 N.E. 145 (1926).
47 Ibid.
43 Martin Jr. v. Heintz, 126 Ohio St. 227, 184 N.E. 852 (1933).
49 Whisman v. Willis, 76 Ohio App. 150, 62 N.. 2d 296 (1945).
50 Y ackee v. Napoleon, 135 Ohio St. 344, 359, 21 N.E. 2d 111 (1939).
5' 116 Ohio Laws 249, effective Sept. 2, 1935. The section now reads as
follows: "When, upon the statements in the pleadings or upon the evidence
received upon the trial, one party is entitled by law to judgment in his favor,
judgment shall be rendered by the court, although a verdict has been found
against such party and whether or not motion to direct a verdict may have
been made or overruled, but no judgment shall be rendered by the court on
the ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence."
52 122 Ohio Laws 686, effective Sept. 27, 1947.
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the verdict is rendered must act expeditiously in filing a motion for
judgment notwithstanding verdict under General Code, Section
11601.
It is not so clear whether General Code, Section 11599-1 applies
to the type 3f judgment notwithstanding verdict provided for by
General Code, Section 11420-18: "When a special finding of facts
is inconsistent with the general verdict, the former shall control
the latter, and the court may give judgment accordingly." The
word "may" has been construed to mean "shall" and the duty to
render judgment on the special findings is mandatory.53 The judg-
ment on the special findings is in fact entered "notwithstanding
the verdict" and the motion is frequently referred to as a "motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict." 54 It would not be a
strained construction to hold that General Code, Section 11599-1
applies to both types of motion for judgment notwithstanding
verdict. However, it is conceivable that the courts may limit its
application to the type of motion contemplated by General Code,
Section 11601 and hold it inapplicable to the judgment on special
findings under General Code, Section 11420-18.
On appeal when the court of appeals decides that the trial
court committed error in overruling a motion for directed verdict
or for judgment notwithstanding verdict, it should render the
judgment which the lower court should have rendered rather
than remanding the case for a new trial or for rendition of judg-
ment.5 5
53 Central Gas Co. v. Hope Oil Co., 113 Ohio St. 354, 364, 149 NX. 386
(1925).
S4Id. p. 358; Daly v. Savage, 27 Ohio App. 133, 160 N.E. 881 (1927); Spill-
man v. Baltimore & Ohio S.W.R.R. Co., 3 Ohio L. Rep. 544 (1906); Davis v.
Turner, 69 Ohio St. 101, 68 N.E. 819 (1903).
S5 Majoros v. Cleveland Interurban Rd. Co., 127 Ohio St. 255, 187 N,.
857 (1933).
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